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ANTIDOTES FOR DISPOSITIONAL ESSENTIALISM 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since the mid-90s dispositionalism, the view that dispositions are irreducible, real 
properties, gained strength due to forceful counterexamples (finks and antidotes) 
that could be launched against Humean anti-dispositionalist attempts to reductively 
analyse dispositional predicates. 
In the light of these anti-Humean successes, and in combination with ideas 
surrounding metaphysical necessity put forward by Kripke and Putnam, some 
dispositionalists felt encouraged to propose a strong anti-Humean view under the 
name of “Dispositional Essentialism”. 
In this paper, I show that, ironically, the counterexamples dispositionalists have used 
against the Humean reductive analysis of dispositional predicates also prove to be 
problems for a strong form of dispositional essentialism that assimilates 
dispositionality and metaphysical necessity. 
Help comes from an unlike ally—Carnapian reductions sentences—but the alliance 
is not unproblematic. 
1. THE COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF DISPOSITIONAL PREDICATES  
Humean minded philosophers have argued: if dispositions, like, for example, fragility 
and solubility, were real properties they would bring an anti-Humean element to the 
world. The disposition would somehow point towards its manifestation and thereby 
generate a connection in nature, a necessity between wholly distinct entities, the existence 
of which Hume, allegedly, proved to be nonexistent. Consequently one should, as a 
Humean, deny the existence of dispositional properties. 
One way to get rid of dispositions is, presumably, to eliminate them at a very early 
stage, namely already at the level of discourse: one should, as a Humean, aim to show  
that dispositional talk can be translated into terms of a language free from dispositional 
predicates (as famously the logical empiricists tried to do). Preferably, a simple reductive 
analysis along the following lines would suffice: 
x has the disposition D ↔ if x were exposed to the test T, x would show the 
reaction R, i.e.: Dx iff Tx  Rx. 
For example: x is fragile  ↔ if x were dropped, x would break. 
If a semantic reductive analysis of dispositional predicates along these lines is 
successful then the existence of dispositional properties is, so the Humean, put into 
doubt. Yet, anti-Humean dispositionalists—that is, those philosophers who believe that 
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dispositions are irreducible, real properties—have launched forceful counterexamples to 
such counterfactual analyses which are supposed to show that no such analysis can 
succeed. Some of these counterexamples have reached folkloric status within analytic 
metaphysics: 
2. FINKS AND ANTIDOTES 
The simple counterfactual analysis (as above) saw, for example, its downfall with C. 
B. Martin’s seminal paper Dispositions and Conditionals (Martin 1994). Martin has 
convincingly shown that a pure counterfactual conditional is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for an object to be disposed to react. His example is a live wire (live being the 
disposition in question) to which a machine—Martin calls it an “electro-fink”—is 
connected. This machine is built in such a way that it stops the power supply 
immediately if the wire is touched by a conductor. The conditional analysis of “x is live”, 
taken to be “if x were touched by a conductor, then electric current would flow from x 
to the conductor” is inadequate, since the wire is live ex hypothesi, but the conditional is 
not true due to the fink. So, the conditional is not necessary. We can rephrase the story 
mutatis mutandis such that a reverse-electro-fink is operating on a non-live wire and 
thereby show that the conditional is not sufficient either. 
A forceful counterexample of a different nature, to a counterfactual analysis of a 
more sophisticated kind, has been given by Alexander Bird in his Dispositions and Antidotes 
(Bird 1998). Bird’s counterexample was targeted at David Lewis analysis in Finkish 
Dispositions (Lewis 1997) which was supposed to handle at least Martin’s finks. Both 
Bird’s and Lewis’s efforts have been duly discussed in the literature and I wish to spare 
the reader the details here.1 Suffice it to say that what Bird calls an “antidote” is an 
interference with the temporal succession of causal events starting with the disposition’s 
stimulus s and (possibly) ending with manifestation r. The difference between finks and 
antidotes is that finks destroy the disposed object’s internal structure so that the 
disposition is lost when triggered. Bird’s antidotes, however, leave the disposed object in 
tact. (This is not important for the considerations in this paper, though.)  
One of Bird’s examples is a uranium pile (cf. Bird 1998: 229). It has the disposition 
to chain-react catastrophically (r, the response) when above critical mass (s, the stimulus). 
                                                
1 The history of the ups and downs of the reductive analysis is well documented. See, for example, 
(Malzkorn 2001) and (Schrenk 2009b). Detailed analyses of Lewis’s, Bird’s and many other attempts can be 
found in the literature listed in footnote 2. 
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Yet, there is a safety mechanism—the antidote—which lets boron moderating rods 
penetrate the pile in case radioactivity increases. The boron rods absorb the radiation and 
so, although the stimulus s is given (uranium is above critical mass) and although the 
intrinsic structure of the uranium pile is not altered (it remains disposed to chain react) 
the uranium will not display the disposition’s manifestation r. 
Bird concludes: 
The existence of the causal basis plus stimulus will never be enough to guarantee the 
required response nor, if the response comes into being, that it came about in the 
right way. A causal chain can always be interfered with. (Bird 1998a: 233; my emphasis) 
Needles to say, there have been further attempts to rescue the counterfactual 
analysis. One version of such attempts aims to exclude the peculiar intervention of finks 
and antidotes by upgrading the counterfactual’s antecedent with some proviso clause and 
thereby restore the analysis’ reductive force: “Conditionals which give the sense of power 
ascriptions are always understood to carry a saving clause.” (Martin 1994: 5; my emphasis). 
Specifically targeted at his own example Martin offers: “If the wire is touched by a 
conductor and other things are equal, then electrical current flows from the wire to the 
conductor” (Martin 1994: 5). In formulae: Dx iff Cx & Tx  Rx (where C holds other 
things, i.e., external influences fixed, or states some adequate conditions, or…). 
However, it proved to be doubtful whether this move is successful for, as Martin 
could show, it seems impossible to spell out explicitly and adequately what is meant by 
such a “saving” or “ceteris paribus” or “other things are equal” clause: a complete explicit 
(extensional) exclusion list, C, of all finks, all antidotes and all other unwanted interferers 
would possibly be infinite and thus not available to us. Bird agrees with Martin on this 
point: “It is certain that the circumstances c, whether rare or common, are not finitely 
specifiable” (Bird 1998a: 233). This, however, would seem to be a necessary requirement 
for a reductive analysis. 
Unfortunately, also a general (intensional) characterisation of finks and other 
interferers seems impossible: Martin points out that the only one feature the to-be-
excluded interferers share is that each of them brings it about that it is not the case that 
the disposition manifests itself (cf. Martin 1994: 6). However, if we take this feature to 
characterise the interferers and enhance the counterfactual analysis of the dispositional 
predicate accordingly we end up in a circular, tautological characterisation (here again 
targetting Martin’s original example): The wire is live iff  
if the wire is touched by a conductor, and nothing happens to make it false that the 
wire is live […] then electrical current flows from the wire to the conductor. (Martin 
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1994: 6; my emphasis) 
As a consequence Martin, and with him many other proponents of dispositional 
realism, see the counterfactual analysis ultimately fail. Their conclusion is radical and 
pessimistic: “Counterfactuals have a place, of course, only as clumsy and inexact 
linguistic gestures to dispositions and they should be kept in that place.” (Martin 1994: 7-
8) Consequently many dispositionalists have taken the (alleged) failure of the analysis as 
good evidence and great motivation for the belief that dispositions are irreducible, real 
properties.2 
Of course many further suggestions to save the reductive analysis and more 
counterexamples have been given. In fact, the analyses vs. counterexamples rivalry can 
soon compete with the “Gettier industry” in epistemology.3 While some Humeans 
remain optimistic that some reduction will eventually succeed it seems to be consensus 
amongst dispositionalists that “the problem of providing a way of specifying C […] has 
so far found no satisfactory solution” (Bird 2007: 38) 
I do not want to judge who is right here, the dispositionalists or the Humeans. 
Rather I would like to show next that if the dispositionalists’ arguments against the 
reductive counterfactual analysis along the lines of Tx  Rx are successful and the 
analysis has to be dropped then so must convictions (some) dispositionalists themselves 
hold. In more detail, a dispositionalist cannot both believe in the failure of the 
counterfactual analysis and also be a dispositional essentialist of a certain strong kind that 
links the dispositional power too closely to a metaphysically necessary conditional (see, 
for example, Bird and Ellis). The two next sections introduce the doctrine of dispositional 
                                                
2 Which consequences we should really draw from the (alleged) failure of a semantic analysis is, of course, 
more controversial than we suppose here. Inspired by logical empiricists’ (anti-)metaphysics, their 
epistemology, and verificationist semantics people have assumed that if Humeans should be able to 
provide a watertight analysis that answers to all possible counterexamples then dispositions are not real and 
vice versa. Yet, outside the constraints of empiricism/verificationism, conclusions from semantics to 
metaphysics are not so straightforward. 
John Heil, for example, points out: “Even if you could concoct a conditional analysis of dispositionality 
impervious to counter-examples, it is not clear what you would have accomplished. You would still be 
faced with the question, What are the truth makers for dispositional claims? Suppose you decide that 
‘object o is fragile’ implies and is implied by ‘o would shatter if struck in circumstances C ’. You are not 
excused from the task of saying what the truth maker might be for this conditional. Presumably, if the 
conditional is an analysis, its truth maker will be whatever the truth maker is for the original dispositional 
assertion. This is progress?” (Heil 2005: 345) 
Be that as it may, all that is needed for the argument of the rest of the paper is, in any case, only the 
assumption that the counterfactual analysis is under threat by finks, antidotes, and other possible 
interferences whether or not this amounts to an argument against such analyses and for dispositional 
realism or not. 
3 To name but a few: (Molnar 1999), (Malzkorn 2000) with a reply by (Mumford 2001), (Gunderson 2000) 
with a reply by Bird (Bird 2000), (Choi 2003, 2006). 
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essentialism. The mentioned friction between dispositionality and necessity will emerge en 
passant. 
3. A FURTHER, INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF ANTI-HUMEAN CONNEC-
TIONS IN NATURE 
Independent of the debates surrounding dispositions, a further anti-Humean 
element in metaphysics has gained strength in the past decades: many philosophers 
subscribe to the ideas put forward by Kripke and Putnam who have made acceptable the 
belief in a conceptually contingent, a posteriori, de re connection in nature, namely 
metaphysical necessary. On the basis of Kripke’s and Putnam’s arguments many people saw 
the chance of a revival of anti-Humean metaphysics of a broad kind. Stathis Psillos, for 
example, comments: 
It was Kripke's liberating views in the early 1970s that changed the scene radically. By 
defending the case of necessary statements, which are known a posteriori, Kripke 
[1972] made it possible to think of the existence of necessity in nature which is weaker 
than logical necessity, and yet strong enough to warrant the label necessity. (Psillos 
2002: 161; my emphasis)4 
Kripke and Putnam’s claims include theoretical identifications, that is, the identity of 
properties, “water is necessarily H2O”; one’s origin, “I necessarily originated from a 
particular sperm and ovum”; individual objects possessing properties, “This desk is necessarily 
made of wood”; and natural kinds possessing certain features: “Tigers are essentially 
mammals”. 
The details of Kripke’s (et al.) arguments surrounding externalist semantics, direct 
reference, rigid designation, etc. are well known and there is no need to discuss them 
here at large. For the sake of the argument of this paper I accept them uncritically.5 
4. DISPOSITIONAL ESSENTIALISM 
Unsurprisingly, amongst those who defend essentialism there are also many 
dispositionalists and the combination of the two, called “dispositional essentialism”, leads to 
the claim that natural kinds have some of their dispositional features essentially. For 
                                                
4 I am not saying here that Psillos is an anti-Humean. I quote him because he gives expression to the view 
that Kripke was significantly involved in the anti-Humean revolution the defenders of essentialism and de 
re necessity have attempted. 
5 Yet, I wish to add that I am generally not convinced by the original Kripkean arguments and that I rather 
endorse Humean or conventionalist intuitions in regard to (metaphysical) necessity. 
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example: “necessarily, salt is soluble”, where NaCl is the natural kind and solubility the 
respective disposition.6 
A particularly strong form of dispositional essentialism goes beyond this mere 
combination of the two doctrines. This strong version not only says that dispositions are 
possessed by kinds with necessity but they merge necessity and dispositionality, i.e., they 
bring together the anti-Humean connection that dispositions bring to the world and de re 
necessity: not only do kinds possess their dispositional features necessarily but, also, a 
triggered disposition is said to metaphysically necessitate it’s manifestation. Both the 
atemporal correlations of kinds and their dispositional features and the diachronic causal 
events from the trigger to a manifestation of a disposition are considered to be necessary. 
We find explicit expression of this belief in the writings of, for example, Brian Ellis 
and Alexander Bird: 
Therefore, […] for all x, necessarily, if x has p [MS: the power], and x is in 
circumstances of the kind C, then x will display an effect of the kind E. (Ellis 2002: 
158; my emphasis) 
Necessarily if the potency is instantiated and receives its stimulus, then the 
manifestation will occur. (Bird 2007: 64) 
Note that, ironically, these statements are not dissimilar to the Humeans’ reductive 
analyses in that they closely relate the disposition to a conditional: the Humean offers the 
reductive Dx iff (Tx  Rx) which is said to have failed; the dispositional essentialists 
give us: ( Dx & Tx ⊃ Rx). 
There are important differences between the two, though. The first, (i), is that Bird’s 
and Ellis’s statements use an anti-humean metaphysically necessary conditional instead of 
the weaker counterfactual conditional and, in this respect, make a stronger claim; the 
second, (ii), is that their formulation does not completely exhaust the disposition’s 
character. In this respect their version is weaker. This is visible in that Bird and Ellis do 
not offer an explicit semantic explication along the lines of, for example, the bi-
conditional Dx iff ( Tx ⊃ Rx ) for the dispositional predicate D.7 Rather, they make the 
having of the disposition a (crucial)8 part of the antecedent of the conditional: 
                                                
6 I will set aside generally important but here irrelevant distinctions between essences and necessary 
properties (cf. Fine 1994, 2002). 
7 Note that this is at variance with my (Schrenk 2009a) where I have taken the dispositional essentialist to 
mean the stronger “Dx iff (Tx⊃Rx)” and where I discuss the inadequacy of that formulation. 
8 I say “an (essential) part of the antecedent” because the essentialist dispositionalist would probably want 
to deny that (Tx ⊃ Rx) holds just by itself for, on their dispositionalist account, it is precisely x’s having 
of the disposition that powers the reaction from stimulus to manifestation. Thus, the conditional is itself 
conditional on Dx. 
Markus Schrenk  |  Research Fellow  |  DFG Project  Causation & Explanation|  Cologne 
Department of Philosophy, University of Cologne 
markus.schrenk@uni-koeln.de   | http://www.clde.uni-koeln.de/schrenk 
 
 
 7 
(Dx & Tx ⊃ Rx). Thereby, they give (at most) a partial definition of what it means to 
have that disposition. I come back to this point in section 7. 
5. FINKS AND ANTIDOTES FOR (STRONG) DISPOSITIONAL ESSENTIALISM 
I will now show that Bird’s and Ellis’s strong form of dispositional essentialism—
which does not only state that properties have their dispositional powers essentially but 
that also, qua the dispositional power, a disposition’s manifestation is necessitated by its 
stimulus—are problematic. I will then, in the next section, introduce a strategy to counter 
the worries here raised. This strategy might be successful but it will also reveal that the 
relation between dispositionality and necessity is not straightforward. 
The cause for trouble is rather ironic: dispositionalists who believe that antidotes, 
finks and the like are convincing arguments against the counterfactual conditional 
analysis of dispositional predicates (counterfactually linking trigger and manifestation) 
cannot also believe the stronger claim that there is a necessary link between a triggered 
disposition and its manifestation. Clearly, the two statements that “Necessarily if the 
potency is instantiated and receives its stimulus, then the manifestation will occur.” (Bird 
2007: 64) and “A causal chain can always be interfered with.” (Bird 1998a: 233) do not go 
together well. 
In other words, if the dispositionalists’ arguments against the counterfactual analysis 
are taken seriously (and most dispositionalists do take them seriously) then there is no 
reductive counterfactual (not even a sophisticated one that is backed up by proviso 
clauses) along the lines of “if x were touched by a conductor, then electric current would 
flow from x to the conductor”. However, if this is taken for granted then it is even less 
plausible to believe that a logically stronger conditional “necessarily, if x is live and 
touched by a conductor then electric current flows from x to the conductor” can hold: if 
the dispositionalists’ arguments are successful against counterfactuals along the lines of 
Dx iff Tx  Rx then they must, a forteriori, also prove wrong the stronger necessity 
claim ( Dx & Tx ⊃ Rx ). 
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6. A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REDUCTIONIST ANALYSES AND (MERE) 
INFORMATIVE EXPLICATIONS 
I wish to suggest a way in which the dispositional essentialists might be able to 
defend their suggestion. Above I said that their claim is, in one respect, (i), stronger than 
the Humeans’ analysis—it proposes a metaphysically necessary conditional where the 
Humean used only a counterfactual conditional—but also that, in another respect, their 
statement is weaker: the dispositionalists neither mean their claim to be a reductive analysis 
nor could they because, (ii), it does not come in the form of an explicit definition. 
The crucial idea to defend the dispositionalists against the trouble the stronger aspect 
of their statement, (i), causes is to utilise the modesty, (ii), their proposal displays in this 
other respect. Here is how this defence might work:9 
The fink and antidote examples to the counterfactual analysis let us too easily forget 
an important, if trivial, fact: ontologically, there clearly are conditions in which, for 
example, fragile glasses always break, live wires do conduct electricity, salt definitely 
dissolves, etc. The trouble is not that these conditions do not exist, the trouble is that we 
fail to be able to spell out exactly what they are in such a way that we arrive at a non-
gappy, non-empty, non-circular counterfactual analysis which can be said to reductively 
analyse the dispositional predicate. 
But again, the fact that we, epistemically and/or semantically can’t get a good grip on 
these conditions for the strict requirements of a reductive semantic analysis does neither 
mean that these conditions do, ontologically, not exist10 nor that a less demanding, 
maybe benignly circular, yet still informative characterisation (as opposed to a strictly reductive 
analysis) of dispositions can be given. And, so, the dispositional essentialist might claim 
that the requirements for the soundness of their metaphysically informative statement 
about dispositions are weaker than the prerequisites for reductive semantic analyses. In 
other words, they could claim that some informative, non-reductive statement along the 
                                                
9 Another possible move to reconcile dispositionalism with the dispositionalist’s necessary conditional is to 
point out that for an important set of dispositional properties—namely, for the fundamental, basic, 
perfectly natural ones—there are no finks (and many other interferers). Bird endorses this line of argument 
in Nature’s Metaphysics (Bird 2007: chapter 3.3). (However, he also concedes that antidotes might be 
possible even on the fundamental level and therefore still be problematic.) 
10 To deny their existence seems almost to deny the uniformity of nature: repeat again everything involving 
a disposed object and the same will again happen to that object. 
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lines of ( Dx & Tx & Cx ⊃ Rx ) is possible, where C are just vaguely described 
conditions that guarantee the absence of any interference.11 
As Martin showed, this would be hopeless for the reductively interpreted Dx iff 
Tx & Cx  Rx because the bi-conditional analysis would turn out to be unacceptably 
circular—we most probably have to mention the disposition itself in the characterisation 
of what the absence of any interference is—but for the dispositionalist’s statement the 
disposition may well be mentioned again in the characterisation of C. There’s no 
circularity to fear for there is no ambition to spell out explicitly what the disposition is in 
its entirety.12 
7. REDUCTION SENTENCES 
Surprisingly, the dispositionalists’ ( Dx & Tx & Cx ⊃ Rx ) together with much that 
has been said in the previous section is reminiscent of one of the early empiricist 
attempts to get hold of dispositional predicates, namely of Carnap’s reduction sentences. 
Having convinced himself that an explicit definition of dispositional predicates along the 
lines of a material conditional—Dx iff (Tx ⊃ Rx)—would not work, Carnap offered, in 
his Testability and Meaning (Carnap 1936/37) the statement Tx ⊃ (Dx ⊃ Rx) as a step 
towards an analysis of dispositional predicates (mostly accompanied by the additional 
Tx ⊃ (¬Dx ⊃ ¬Rx) ). These so called “reduction sentences” are only partial or implicit 
definitions of dispositional predicates for they do not enable us to replace “D” wherever 
it occurs, as, for example, the explicit definition Dx iff (Tx ⊃ Rx) with its equivalence 
between definiendum und definiens would: 
[T]he terms introduced in this way have the disadvantage that in general it is not 
possible to eliminate them, i.e. to translate a sentence containing such a term into a 
sentence containing previous terms only. (Carnap 1936: 443) 
In order to overcome or, at least, minimise the resulting indeterminacy (and deficit in 
reductive power) Carnap suggested to gradually add further reduction sentences to the 
original single one and thus offer a whole list of partial definitions capturing more and 
more of the disposition’s (dispositional predicate’s) character. We might, for example, 
                                                
11 To be fair to Ellis I have to confess that I omitted a line from his quote where he already attempts to 
exclude interferences in this fashion: “Therefore, […] for all x, necessarily, if x has P, and x is in 
circumstances of the kind C, then x will display an effect of the kind E, unless there are defeating conditions that 
would mask this display.” (Ellis 2001: 286; my emphasis) As I will show now, this is still problematic. 
12 There is a danger here, of course, that (Dx&Tx&Cx⊃Rx) turns out to be analytically rather then (merely) 
metaphysically necessary due to an unfortunate definition of C. One would hope that analyticity can be 
avoided. 
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want to add T*x ⊃ (Dx ⊃ R*x) and further statements with yet different trigger-reaction 
pairs. This could be inspired both by further conceptual analysis—we might find that the 
dispositional predicate should also (partially) mean that test T* is followed by reaction 
R*—or, indeed, by empirical research: we might find out that also T*x ⊃ (Dx ⊃ R*x) is 
correct for all objects for which Tx ⊃ (Dx ⊃ Rx) holds. Carnap was aware of the fact 
that conceptual analysis and the acquisition of empirical knowledge go hand in hand at 
this point and that, thus, the partial definitions, taken together, have empirical content 
(cf. Carnap 1936: 444). 
The dispositional essentialists’ ( Dx & Tx & Cx ⊃ Rx )—or, equivalently, and in 
line with Carnap, ( TCx ⊃ (Dx ⊃ Rx))
13—is also only a partial and implicit explication 
of the disposition in the sense that it (only) gives some information about some (crucial) 
aspect of the disposition, namely that necessarily, when triggered with T in the right 
circumstances, C, the disposed object, D, will react with reaction R. Yet, it does by no 
means exhaust what the disposition D is and can otherwise give rise to. It remains silent 
about, for example, all those interesting cases where the conditions, C, are not ideal and 
the disposition does not quite deliver R but a partial manifestation only. Also, just like 
Carnap’s reduction sentences, the dispositional essentialist’s claim does not entitle us to 
replace the predicate “D” wherever it occurs.  
This should be perceived as no disadvantage for the dispositional essentialists for it 
is anyway not in their aim to reductively analyse dispositions (dispositional predicates). 
On the contrary, dispositions are meant to be real properties in their own right for which 
no such analysis (and later replacement) is wanted.14 
In fact, Carnap’s idea to accumulate additional reduction sentences for the same 
dispositional predicate should suit the dispositional essentialist well. Not only might the 
very same disposition D give raise to further, different trigger and reaction events —
electric conductivity might turn out to be linked also to heat conduction—more 
importantly, as mentioned above briefly, we have to remember that 
( TCx ⊃ (Dx ⊃ Rx) ) captures only a disturbance-free trigger and a pure reaction. 
However, disposed objects are rarely in such ideal circumstances and, so, rarely show a 
disposition’s pure manifestation. Yet, a dispositional essentialist would surely want to say 
that what happens in those impure cases happens, too, necessitated by the disposition. In 
                                                
13 I have merged Tx and Cx into TCx and given a formulation that is logically equivalent to the 
dispositional essentialist. A remaining dissimilarity to Carnap is, of course, the necessity operator. 
14 Unless, of course, the dispositional essentialist really would like to see dispositions and dispositionality 
completely reduced to metaphysical necessity. Yet, see (Schrenk 2009a) for the hopelessness of this aim. 
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other words, ( TC* ⊃ (Dx ⊃ R*x) ) shall hold just as much as the pure case, where, 
here, TC* is a trigger in not quite disturbance-free circumstances and R* is not quite the 
disposition’s pure manifestation. 
A sheer infinity of such statements could, in principle, be added but clearly no subset 
exhausts the disposition D’s whole character. Yet, this is perfectly in line with the 
dispositionalist’s credo that dispositions are real properties in their own right that cannot 
be analysed away. 
8. EVALUATION: THE RELATA  AND THEIR DIACHRONICITY, THE 
MONOTONICITY OF NECESSITY 
I wish to shed some more light on what the conditions C commit us to. Some 
tension between metaphysical necessity and dispositionality will emerge that might be a 
little worrisome for the dispositionalist’s version of Carnapian reduction sentences 
despite the positive assessment given so far.15 
The Relata  and their Diachronicity. It has to be noted that the dispositional 
essentialists’ claims bring, due to circumstances C, a whole new type of metaphysically 
necessary statements to the Kripke and Putnam classes of statements. Circumstances C, 
so we have granted the dispositionalist, can be described as those conditions a disposed 
object has to be in such that no interferer (antidote, fink, mask, etc.) is or will be present 
at least till it is certain that the reaction comes about (i.e., C has to take care even of very 
late preventions). What this tells us about C, ontologically speaking, is that C has to fix 
whatever is in the light-cone just before R so to make absolutely sure that no interference 
can sneak in. Note, that C has to encompass also what might actually seem to be causally 
irrelevant for the disposition’s manifestation: already space-time regions that could only 
possibly house a potential interferer have to be, so to speak, silenced pre-emptively 
because we wish to make a statement that is not only factually true but necessarily true i.e., 
true in all possible worlds. And, so, we have to exclude also interferers that are merely 
possible.16 
                                                
15 For further charges see my (Schrenk 2009a). 
16 This is, of course, no new argument: already Russell argued in his famous “On the Notion of Cause” 
(Russell 1912/2003) that “in order to be sure of the expected effect, we must know that there is nothing in 
the environment to interfere with it. But this means that the supposed cause [corresponding to a minimal 
antecedent in a disposition; my addendum] is not, by itself, adequate to ensure the effect.” (Russell 
1912/2003: 169) 
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This is a major commitment for C and also for what the necessity operator holds 
together: in ( Dx & Tx & Cx ⊃ Rx ), metaphysical necessity not only binds the 
disposition and a simple trigger to a reaction but, rather, whole world states to a 
succeeding world state. 
Moreover, we must not forget that statements of dispositional trigger-manifestation 
correlations should bear time variables, which have so far been omitted for simplicity. 
Instead of ( Dx & Tx & Cx ⊃ Rx ) we should rather write something like 
( D(x, t) & T(x, t) & C(x, t) ⊃ R(x, ∆t) )17. However, none of the Kripke/Putnam cases 
is about diachronic successions in time. Remember that Kripke and Putnam’s original 
examples are all similar to the timeless “water is necessarily H2O”, “I necessarily 
originated from a particular sperm and ovum”, “This desk is necessarily made of wood”, 
or “Tigers are essentially mammals”. 
Taking now both considerations together—that the relata are not individuals or kinds 
or properties but also include world state types and events and that we are confronted 
with successions in time rather than with atemporal statements—we might start to doubt 
whether Kripke and Putnam’s metaphysical necessity is at all applicable here: the transfer 
of metaphysical necessity to the dispositional cases—from static, eternal facts to the 
necessary connections among events in the natural world—seems only permissible either 
if it can be shown that Kripke-Putnam style arguments which might be successful in 
synchronic or atemporal relations of individuals, kinds, and properties can also be 
applied effectively to diachronic succession cases linking world states and events, or 
failing a direct application of the Kripke-Putnam machinery of direct reference, rigid 
designation, etc., if we can give an otherwise plausible argument for why we should 
assume that metaphysical necessity is also the binding force in these diachronic über-
events. 
Monotonicity of Necessity. There is a further worry that needs to be addressed. It 
questions not the nature of the relata and their diachronicity but the robustness of the 
metaphysical necessity under concern. Take, for comparison, one of the orthodox 
statements of metaphysical necessity as found in Kripke and Putnam and their followers: 
“necessarily, electrons are negatively charged”. If true then, since it is in the essence of 
electrons to be so charged, any particular electron will be charged no matter what: whether 
it is surrounded by a magnetic field, or in the presence of a neutron, or being subjected 
                                                
17 Cf. the formulations with time variables Lewis and Bird introduced in (Lewis 1994) and (Bird 1998). 
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to gravitation, etc. In other words, one could, in principle, add anything one pleases to 
the antecedent of a conditional like “necessarily, if x is an electron then x is negatively 
charged”. It still holds with necessity that if x is an electron and in a magnetic field, and in the 
presence of a neutron and … then x is negatively charged. Necessity is, to take a notion 
normally applied to logical entailment, monotonic: antecedent strengthening does not affect 
the original necessary conditional regarding electrons and negative charge. One might 
even be tempted to suggest that antecedent strengthening is a test for the alleged 
necessity: if it is true that electrons are negatively charged, come what may, then you are 
justified to state a necessary relation between electrons and negative charge. 
Things turn out to be crucially different in the case of dispositions, their triggers and 
their manifestations. Here, not everything goes.18 On the contrary, it proved to be 
important to add to the first envisaged antecedent, Dx & Tx, an exclusion clause C such 
that unwanted additional factors are debarred. In fact, the conditions C in 
( Dx & Tx & Cx ⊃ Rx) are there to disallow antecedent strengthening because the 
presence of a fink, an antidote, or other interferences would make the conditional false. 
The relation between Dx & Tx  and Rx is only robust, that is, of necessity, if no antecedent 
strengthening is allowed, i.e., if the above envisaged necessity-robustness test is, with the 
help of C, forbidden by fiat.  
I will leave it an open question whether, therefore, necessity has been obtained 
surreptitiously only but I believe the last word has not yet been spoken on the 
metaphysical necessity of dispositionality.19 
9. SUMMARY 
Within the last 10-15 years dispositionalism, the view that dispositions are real 
irreducible properties, has gained a lot of support. This is partially due to a debate 
between Humean minded philosophers, who aim to give reductive analyses of 
dispositional predicates, and anti-Humean oriented dispositionalists, who have launched 
forceful counterarguments against this eliminative analysis. 
                                                
18 Kit Fine observes similarly: “It would be harder, for example, to break the connection between the truth 
of P&Q and the truth of P than the connection between cause and effect.” (Fine 2002: 278-9). 
19 Thanks are due to Stephen Mumford, Matthew Tugby, Charlotte Matheson and Rani Lill Anjum for 
invaluable discussions of this observation. 
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There has been a second anti-Humean movement in current analytic metaphysics: 
Kripke’s arguments in Naming and Necessity have encouraged people to believe in 
metaphysical de re necessity and, related, in a modern version of essentialism. 
When these two strands of anti-Humean reasoning are combined they culminate in 
what has frequently been called “dispositional essentialism”. This is the stance that (all or 
most) properties or kinds have their dispositional roles necessarily. 
A stronger version of dispositional essentialism aims to bring necessity and 
dispositionality even closer together in that it sees the disposition involved in a necessary 
conditional featuring the trigger and the manifestation of the disposition: “necessarily, if 
something has power P and is triggered, it displays the power’s manifestation”. 
In this paper I have shown that the tenability of this statement is debatable for 
precisely the reasons the Humean reductive analysis was problematic. However, I have 
also shown that strong dispositional essentialism might escape these problems because 
the strict rules for reductive semantic analyses might not apply to mere metaphysical 
explications or characterisations of dispositionality.  
Yet, other grave difficulties still remain: the alleged metaphysical necessity of 
( Dx & Tx & Cx ⊃ Rx ) bears some strong dissimilarities to those cases of necessity 
Kripke and Putnam originally introduced: the relata are different and it is a diachronic 
business rather than being synchronic or atemporal. Moreover, it is not entirely clear 
whether the robustness of the alleged necessity has been properly earned or whether it 
has been obtained surreptitiously. 
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